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Comment
An Argument for Expanding the
Application of Rule 53(b) to Facilitate
Reference of the Special Master in
Electronic Data Discovery
by Richard H. Agins*
"[Sipecial masters can help redress the imbalance of resources that
demoralizes a court that is confronted by the squads of lawyers
and masses of data that invariably accompany major cases."1
"It is no longer a question of whether or not electronic data will be
targeted in a given litigation. Now it is a question of when and
how it will be done."2
"Yahoo!, one of the big Internet service providers, gets so many
subpoenas today for e-mail that they have a separate fax line set up
just for subpoenas."3
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is due to Professor Bennett L. Gershman for his rigorous and candid analysis of
this Note. Its favorable attributes are largely the product of his insight; its infir-
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measure to Victoria Oswald and her staff for their fine editorial work.
1. WAYNE D. BRAZIL ET AL., MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 5 (American Bar Foundation 1983).
2. Symposium, Lawyers Online: Discovery, Privilege, and the Prudent Practi-
tioner, 3 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 5, para. 5 (1997) (comments of John Jessen) [here-
inafter Symposium].
3. John Jessen, Special Issues Involving Electronic Discovery, 9 KAN. J. L. &





The volume and volatility of computer generated data pre-
sent novel problems of evidentiary discovery, requiring the em-
ployment of a neutral party with the requisite technical, legal,
and business experience to provide effective oversight and man-
agement. A special master, referred to serve as an impartial
officer of the court pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, can bring a greater level of specialized knowl-
edge, flexibility, involvement, and efficiency to pretrial discov-
ery of electronically generated and stored data ("electronic
data") than can most trial court judges burdened with manag-
ing a full docket.
Introduction
Robust commercial expansion during the past fifty years
and the rapid growth of personal computing have together
spawned a previously unimaginable volume of electronic data.
As the basis of our economy shifts increasingly from manufac-
turing to information transfer and technology development, this
proliferation of data is likely to continue unabated. Much of the
information resulting from casual electronic communication is
of transitory importance and may readily be discarded. But the
majority of commercial data must be retained, either for use by
the originating entity or for review by state and federal regula-
tory agencies. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("FRCP" or "Rules of Procedure") this data is subject to discov-
ery,4 and as the volume of data expands, the problems of discov-
ery become both more numerous and more complex. This trend
suggests the need for intervention by individuals possessing
both specialized technical knowledge and procedural and sub-
stantive legal knowledge.
Businesses and individuals regularly generate electronic
data with no thought either for the challenge presented by its
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) provides that:
a party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties:
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, data
compilations, and tangible things that are in the possession, custody, or con-
trol of the party and that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or
defenses, unless solely for impeachment[.]
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sheer volume or for the need to maintain confidentiality. When
ostensibly private information becomes the subject of a pretrial
discovery request, the uncontrolled generation of electronic data
assumes vastly increased importance.5 In considering an ex-
panded role for the special master 6 in managing electronic data
discovery, this Note will touch upon the problems and pitfalls
resulting from lax institutional management and control of elec-
tronic data, including spoliation of evidence and breach of
confidentiality.
Special masters are referred pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 53(b), which states in relevant part that:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In
actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when
the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury,
save in matters of account and of difficult computation of dam-
ages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some
exceptional condition requires it.7
Thus, the determinative question under Rule 53 is whether on a
trial by jury the issues are sufficiently complicated, or whether
on a bench trial there exists an exceptional condition, such that
the court may refer a master to manage discovery or other as-
pects of the case. In addressing these limitations this Note will
consider the following additional questions:
* What is the present ability of the judiciary to oversee electronic
discovery in the face of the ever-increasing scale of litigation,
and will evolving computer expertise within the judiciary
render the need for extrajudicial assistance merely a transitory
phenomenon?
" What role can the special master fulfill in overseeing discovery
of electronic evidence, and how narrowly should this responsi-
bility be construed?
" Are the rules that presently govern the reference of special
masters sufficient to cope with the rigors of modern litigation
practice arising from electronic discovery?
5. Electronic discovery expert, John Jessen, relates the story of a meeting
with the president of a corporate client, who could not fathom that his company
generated twenty-two million e-mail messages per week. See Jessen, supra note 3,
at 427-34.
6. The terms "master" and "special master" are used interchangeably in this
Note, as they are in practice.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
3
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* What modification to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if
any, is appropriate in response to the demands posed by elec-
tronic discovery?
Because district court judges must hear and rule on many
cases simultaneously, the Rules of Procedure provide a means
for delegation of certain limited aspects of case management to
non-judges, freeing Article III judges to perform those tasks
that they alone are permitted to discharge. Rule 53 - Masters,
governs, inter alia, the assignment or "reference" of a master by
the district court judge to manage tasks such as discovery in
complex litigation.8 Note, however, that Rule 53 does not grant
judges unbridled discretion to delegate responsibility. Rather,
it specifically imposes the requirement that "[a] reference to a
master shall be the exception and not the rule."9 This seem-
ingly straightforward mandate, intended to retain the responsi-
bility for case management firmly within the judge's grasp, has
given rise to much creative interpretation.
Lawyers and jurists often are called upon to theorize how
the framers of legislation would have treated a present-day fact
pattern had it occurred at the time the legislation was enacted.
We must adopt this same theoretical, historical stance in inter-
preting the word "exception" within Rule 53(b). The commercial
climate of 1937 (or of the earlier Equity rules, from which Rule
53 is derived) was very different from that of today, owing
largely to changes in scale and technology spawned by subse-
quent computerization. Accordingly, the meaning of "excep-
tional condition" must be construed in light of the litigation
climate of the 1930s rather than through the contextual lens of
the year 2003.10
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
adopted originally in the 1930s, could not have envisioned how
computerization would affect their newly created body of proce-
dural law. Fortunately, our legal system permits, and in fact
8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
10. Because the determination of what constitutes an "exceptional condition"
is a matter of fact and of degree, today's court must evaluate whether the discovery
demands of a case present a greater degree of difficulty than other similar cases
heard by the court, or more exactly, whether a group of cases share factual similar-
ities that present a more complex discovery scenario than all other cases.
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expects, that our legislators will effect changes in the law in re-
sponse to evolving requirements of our society. As we shall see,
nowhere are these evolving requirements more demanding of
statutory modification than in the area of electronic data discov-
ery management. Conditions considered exceptional in the
1930s may occur today with far greater regularity because of
the proliferation of electronic evidence and because of our tran-
sition from manufacturing to an information-based society. Ac-
cordingly, the involvement of a master in sorting out and
managing the substance of discovery may be appropriate under
far broader circumstances than in the past.
As its principal undertaking, this Note will reconsider the
"exceptional condition" requirement of Rule 53(b) in light of the
demands placed on federal judges by the accelerating growth of
electronic data discovery. Further, it will propose revised word-
ing of the Rule to enable reference of a special master under
broader circumstances than at present, without resort to the
transparent contrivances so often relied upon. In the course of
our analysis, we will consider the characteristics of the elec-
tronic data processing ("EDP") environment that militate in
favor of involving a specially qualified court officer, such as a
special master, in the discovery phase of litigation.
Background
Managing the Discovery Process
Although the Rules of Procedure characterize discovery as
a cooperative process, it is in fact highly adversarial and
presents substantial opportunity for overreaching and abuse.
As the volume of data increases, and as retrieval of that data
becomes easier, the potential for abuse increases
correspondingly.
It has been noted that:
[tihe processing tools required to make use of vast amounts of
electronic data exist in the form of powerful, inexpensive
microcomputers ... [that] did not exist 10 or 15 years ago. Today,
we have hardware and software tools that can be used to identify,
locate, retrieve, and review large volumes of disparate data sets. 1
11. Symposium, supra note 2, at para. 7 (comments of John Jessen).
5
PACE LAW REVIEW
Courts have accepted this newfound ability to sift through huge
quantities of electronic data efficiently, but have done so with-
out first acquiring a thorough understanding of the EDP envi-
ronment. Therefore, "courts are approaching electronic data in
a way no one could have anticipated, by allowing discovery of
backup systems consisting of hundreds of thousands of tapes.' 12
There is substantial evidence that the judiciary has scant un-
derstanding of EDP and of the excessive burden that may be
imposed upon litigants by merely extending the rationale of
traditional discovery to a computerized environment. 13 Those
judges who have the requisite understanding of EDP can curtail
overly broad requests for the production of electronic data by
invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2), which pro-
vides that:
[tihe frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods other-
wise permitted under these rules ... shall be limited by the court
if it determines that (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cu-
mulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. .... 14
Even judges lacking an understanding of EDP must, at a
minimum, acknowledge the need to safeguard litigants' due
process rights by (1) employing adequate procedural controls
covering electronic data discovery requests, and (2) applying the
same standards of reasonableness as those used for evaluating
paper-based discovery. This prompts the dual inquiries, "What
is reasonable?" and "Who should make this determination?"
Clearly, an individual with substantial understanding of both
the legal system and the intricacies of commercial EDP is
needed to resolve these questions fairly and correctly.
This Note suggests that a properly qualified special master
can provide substantial assistance to the court where electronic
data discovery raises difficult questions related to the quantity
or format of information, or to the maintenance of ongoing oper-
ations of the producing party while discovery is in progress.
12. Id. at para. 8 (comments of John Jessen).
13. See Corinne L. Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer
Age: Deciding Who Should Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored
Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 300-01 (2000).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
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It is important to recognize when considering the impact of
computerization upon civil discovery that the need for new dis-
covery management protocols is the result of the format and the
volume of electronic data, and not of its substantive content.
Electronic discovery expert John Jessen notes in a comment
reminiscent of that by the late Senator Everett Dirksen,15 that:
We have had about half a dozen cases now where the total num-
ber of [relevant] electronic things brought into play ... went over
one billion. A billion pieces of discovery material. Those kinds of
numbers introduce a whole host of issues about scope and man-
agement. How do you manage a billion things like that in an evi-
dentiary way? Each one is very simple . . . but a lot of small
numbers start to get you. You start multiplying a second or two
by a billion, you've got some serious problems. 16
The key to successful electronic data discovery manage-
ment, then, is to enlist the services of an individual with the
requisite time, legal knowledge, and business skills to deter-
mine the appropriate boundaries of discovery requests, the fea-
sibility of producing the requested data, and the apportionment
of costs among the parties. This same individual must oversee
the execution of the discovery process and must report his find-
ings to the court as required by Rule 53 and as specified in the
order of reference. Assuming that all the other requirements
for an order of reference are fulfilled, the special master would
seem to be eminently qualified for this responsibility.
Privacy Concerns and 'Meta-data'
Many United States residents act under the comforting but
mistaken belief that an unrestricted right of privacy protects all
of their written communications. For the most part, we feel se-
cure in the knowledge that a letter placed in the corner mailbox
will arrive at its destination unopened and unread. It is with
surprise and alarm then, that we discover the unwelcome truth:
15. Democratic Senator Everett Dirksen (1896-1969) is reputed to have com-
mented with respect to excessive federal spending, "A billion here, a billion there,
pretty soon it's real money." RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
REQUESTED FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Suzy Platted., 1989),
available at http://www.bartleby.com/73/800.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2003).
16. Jessen, supra note 3, at 428.
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with a few notable exceptions 17 our electronic communications
do not enjoy the same degree of privacy, as do our conventional
writings.
[T]he content of electronic data files - especially things like elec-
tronic mail - will shock and amaze. The mind-set that is brought
to the electronic world by the average user forces them [sic] to
take computer use in a very casual way. They often put things
into a computer system that they would never put into writing on
a real document .... They believe that if anyone got their hands
on a piece of their electronic mail, privacy rights prohibit
disclosure.'5
It has been estimated that as much as eighty percent of all
possible documents now sought in discovery exist only in elec-
tronic format,19 and that these documents often contain infor-
mation that would be unavailable in non-electronic format, i.e.,
"meta-data."20 "[11f you merely print out paper copies of elec-
tronic files, you may miss some of the juicier pieces of evi-
dence."21 Electronic mail ("e-mail") presents even more fertile
ground for discovery of documents produced by unsuspecting
actors. "The general practitioner doesn't know that once you hit
17. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure confers privilege upon cer-
tain attorney work product and client communications arising from the attorney-
client relationship. In IBM v. Comdisco, a motion to compel discovery of an e-mail
communication from a business manager to a sales representative concerning legal
advice received by the manager was denied because the court held that the persons
involved with the communication were "outside the circle of confidentiality." 91-C-
07-199, 1992 WL 52143, at *1-2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 1992).
18. Symposium, supra note 2, at para. 9 (comments of John Jessen) (citation
omitted).
19. See Charles Christian, Survey Shows Many London Firms in IT Fog, N.Y.
L.J., May 8, 2001, at 5.
20. "'Meta-data' is 'data about data.' That is to say, meta-data is definitional
data that provides information or documentation of the data to which it refers."
Christopher T. Furlow, Article, Erogenous Zoning on the Cyber-Frontier, 5 VA. J. L.
& TECH. 7, 11 n.36 (2000) (quoting Dennis Howe, Free On-Line Dictionary of Com-
puting, at http://www.nightflight.com/cgi-bin/foldoc.cgi?query=meta-data> (last
visited Jan. 10, 2003)).
21. Christian, supra note 19, at 5. In a wrongful discharge action, for exam-
ple, the plaintiff former employee will benefit by showing that a disciplinary warn-
ing allegedly written by the defendant employer prior to discharge was actually
written after notice of litigation, and was backdated. Meta-data within the word
processing file will clearly show the original date on which the letter was written,
notwithstanding the date printed on the face of the document. This meta-data
provides the proverbial "smoking gun." Christian, supra note 19, at 5.
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'delete' and get it out of your inbox that it's not gone[.1"22 Plain-
tiffs counsel seeking to discover the smoking gun should not
overlook the significance of this fact, nor should corporate coun-
sel seeking to ensure that his client never creates incriminating
correspondence in the first place. Further, the master charged
with overseeing discovery must be keenly aware of limitations
upon the right of the requesting party to discover this data and
of the corresponding obligation of the opposing party to produce
it when properly requested.
Data Systems and the Role of Counsel
Until recently, attorneys have been unschooled for the most
part in the techniques of electronic data processing, and have
been unaware of the related discovery considerations. The
transition of business to EDP, however, has made it necessary
for counsel to advise clients regarding the processing, protec-
tion, and preservation of electronic data for possible future liti-
gation. Attorneys who fail to do so unnecessarily risk facing
charges of malpractice. 23 More so than ever before, the opera-
tions executive must consider the foreseeability of litigation
when designing and implementing EDP systems, and both in-
house and independent counsel must share these concerns
actively.
Because the first priority of a business is to conduct its op-
erations profitably and efficiently, records management and
storage systems are tailored to achieve that result, rather than
to afford primacy to the requirements of potential discovery.
Effective counsel must take the initiative to help operations ex-
ecutives harmonize the performance of daily operating func-
tions with the need to retrieve data quickly and inexpensively
in the event of litigation. Failure to plan in advance for discov-
ery may result in significant unforeseen costs and in the imposi-
tion of sanctions if the court believes that the producing party
purposefully has obstructed discovery.
A balance must be achieved between a plaintiffs need for
data and a defendant's cost of production. In a paper document
22. D. Ian Hopper, Computer Sleuths Seek Enron E-mails, at http:fl
news.findlaw.com/200201161011169504.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2002).
23. Christian, supra note 19, at 5.
9
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storage environment, once the underlying structure is under-
stood, recovery of requested documents can proceed without dif-
ficulty, albeit slowly and laboriously. By contrast, the electronic
search of random access media (i.e., hard drives and removable
storage devices) is relatively simple and rapid. Offsetting this
advantage, however, is the fact that a serial-access archival me-
dium such as magnetic tape does not afford the rapid search
capability of random-access media. Consequently, electronic
discovery often is just as burdensome as its manual counter-
part, and is further unfairly encumbered by the court's misap-
prehension of both the feasibility and the cost of compliance.
Counsel for the producing party therefore must be wary of this
possibility and must immediately bring to the court's attention
any undue burden imposed by the scope of the opposing party's
discovery request. The special master also must understand
the cost and feasibility constraints applicable to electronic
discovery.
Electronic data processing has invested the notice require-
ments of discovery with heightened importance. In the pre-
computer era, discovery required searching through, or making
available for search by the requesting party, the contents of the
producing party's relevant files while conducting ongoing busi-
ness as usual. The fact that archived records were being
searched had little if any practical effect upon ongoing opera-
tions. By contrast, a computer-dependent business facing liti-
gation must continue its EDP operations while complying with
a discovery request that presupposes a static computer environ-
ment. In an EDP environment, however, electronic data is con-
tinuously modified, overwritten, and destroyed in the normal
course of business, rendering illusory the concept of a static en-
vironment. This necessitates the employment of special proce-
dures to ensure that the producing party's business may
continue to operate during discovery without interruption, and
also imposes an obligation upon the requesting party to provide
the greatest possible advance notice of its specific requests.
The Master, The Magistrate, and The Expert
Before considering the possible expansion of the special
master's role, it is necessary to review the historical context and
the enabling statutory authority for the appointment of magis-
698 [Vol. 23:689
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trates, masters, and experts, and to explore the differences
among their functions in litigation. This is so because the court
often may elect to employ one to the exclusion of the others.
"A special master or master is an individual who is ap-
pointed by the court to assist in performing specific functions in
a pending action."24 The master is required to prepare a report
on the matters assigned to him, and if appropriate, of his find-
ings of fact, for submission to the court and to the parties.25 In
non-jury actions, the court is required to accept the master's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. 26 "The term
master includes a referee, an auditor, an examiner and an
assessor."
27
The underlying statutory authority for reference of a mag-
istrate has substantive consequences. Whereas the master is
empowered under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 the
magistrate judge is authorized under the United States Magis-
trates Act.29 Because the magistrate is a salaried court officer
his reference as a master, unlike that of the non-jurist, imposes
no additional expense upon the parties and, accordingly, does
not require their consent.30 Further, because the statutory ap-
24. JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.05 (2001).
25. See FED. R. CIv. P. 53(e)(1).
26. See FED. R. CIv. P. 53(e)(2).
27. MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, 53.05.
28. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
29. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (2003).
30. MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, 53.05. In his exhaustive treatment of the
reference of special masters in Managing Complex Litigation: A Practical Guide to
the Use of Special Masters, Professor Wayne D. Brazil considers whether, despite
the consent of the parties, the imposition of the "exceptional condition" require-
ment by Rule 53 nonetheless must be met. BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 1, at 307.
While it is not clear that the Supreme Court would hold that the exceptional
condition requirement is as difficult to satisfy for pretrial references as for
trial-stage appointments, it is clear that district judges who wanted to dele-
gate pretrial tasks would have substantially less freedom if they were con-
strained by Rule 53(b).
BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 1, at 316 (footnotes omitted). Rule 53(b) articulates the
"exception not the rule" constraint imposed upon reference of a master, but also
announces that "[ulpon the consent of the parties, a magistrate judge may be des-
ignated to serve as a special master without regard to the provisions of this subdi-
vision." FED. R. CIv. P. 53(b). It is noteworthy that the Magistrates Act permits
appointment of a magistrate as master without the consent of the parties while
Rule 53 suggests that the consent of the litigants lifts the strictures upon appoint-
ment of a master, the absence of an exceptional condition notwithstanding. It is
11
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pointment of a magistrate does not contain the "exceptional con-
dition" requirement found in Rule 53(b), the district judge
enjoys greater latitude in appointing a magistrate to serve as a
master.
As a subordinate judicial officer, the magistrate may "re-
lieve a district court of specified functions (such as hearing and
determining non-dispositive pretrial matters and submitting
proposed findings of fact and recommendations for rulings on
case-dispositive motions) but may not perform final adjudica-
tive [i.e., Article III] functions .. ."31 This expanded power,
coupled with cost savings to the parties, enhances the attrac-
tiveness of choosing a magistrate with the requisite knowledge
and skills to serve as master.
The magistrate has broader powers and authority than his
non-jurist counterpart and therefore, can be of greater assis-
tance to the district judge in certain respects than can the spe-
cial master. But this benefit comes with a countervailing cost.
The court system, rather than the parties, absorbs the cost of
the magistrate's services, thereby imposing an additional ex-
pense on taxpayers who already are obliged to provide the liti-
gants with a no-cost forum for dispute resolution. In balancing
these factors, the district court judge will have to consider the
needs of his court, the relative financial resources of the liti-
gants and other issues of fairness, as well as constitutional
guarantees of due process.32
The third adjunct to the discovery process is the court-ap-
pointed expert, whose function is to assist in the evaluation of
technical issues. In the realm of electronic data discovery, the
expert will need to possess knowledge of business management
systems and procedures, and of the technical aspects of elec-
tronic data processing, retrieval, and storage. Because this may
among the principal purposes of this Note to consider these conflicting require-
ments and to conclude whether the challenges of electronic discovery, per se, con-
stitute such "exceptional condition."
31. MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, 53.05.
32. "[Tlhere are doctrines, rights, and policies that confine how judges may
exercise [their] power when appointing a special master. Among the most obvious
of these are Article III, the Seventh Amendment right of trial by jury, the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the equal protection norm that the
Supreme Court has found implicit in that clause." BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 1, at
382-83 (discussing how these rights are vindicated procedurally).
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be beyond the capabilities of a single advisor, the court may
elect to appoint several individuals each possessing unique ex-
pertise. The expert plays an informal role that is not specifi-
cally regulated and, while he may be helpful either directly to
the judge or indirectly to the special master, this type of em-
ployment should be used with caution, subject to the consent of
the litigants.33
There are several notable differences between the expert
and the special master that may bear upon a judge's choice of
employment. A court-appointed expert, unlike a master, enjoys
no special presumption as to his opinion and is subject to cross-
examination and other discovery. The findings of the master,
by contrast, can be impeached only if found clearly erroneous.
Because an expert is appointed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 706, he is not subject to the same "exceptional condition"
requirement as the special master.34 This may cause the judge
who regularly encounters formalistic or conservative appellate
review to favor the appointment of an expert over that of a
master.
Unique Challenges of Electronic Data Discovery
Preservation of Data
Spoliation is among the most serious concerns confronting
counsel engaged in electronic data discovery. 35 Counsel for the
requesting party requires assurance that all relevant data will
be preserved for discovery, while counsel for the producing
party seeks confirmation that client data processing and stor-
age operations will suffer no harm as a result of the discovery
process.
The dynamic nature of EDP is such that, every time a com-
puter is turned on, certain internal parameters (such as the
date) change. Depending upon a company's normal document
33. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, T 53.05.
34. See id.
35. Spoliation is defined as the wrongful loss or destruction of evidence. See
Donald C. Massey, Discovery of Electronic Data from Motor Carriers - Is Resis-
tance Futile?, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 145, 166 (1999/2000). A related definition of spolia-
tion which gives rise to "discovery sanctions" is that a party "(1) destroys (2)
discoverable matter (3) which the party knew or should have known (4) was rele-
vant to pending, imminent, or reasonably foreseeable litigation." See Gates Rub-
ber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 167 F.R.D. 90, 101 (D. Colo. 1996).
13
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retention policies, data that might be relevant to discovery may
be deleted, backed-up or overwritten with no intent by the pro-
ducing party to defraud, mislead or conceal. Counsel wishing to
avoid allegations of negligent spoliation 36 therefore has a duty
to review his client's computer policies immediately upon re-
ceipt of service of process. 37 As soon as potential litigation is
anticipated, counsel must explore with technical staff the data
processing, retention and destruction protocols to be observed in
light of potential discovery demands. Inclusion of executive
management in this phase of discussions is merely a courtesy,
as they will have limited knowledge of the technical details so
crucial to data preservation.
Counsel should immediately confirm that the client under-
stands and has implemented procedures to ensure preservation
of electronic data while continuing normal daily data processing
routines. This may entail creating "mirror images" of hard
drives, performing removable-media backups, or employing
other techniques designed to "freeze" data as of the moment of
the discovery request without hampering ongoing operations.
"The importance [to plaintiffs counsel] of sending opposing par-
ties notice is not only to place the duty to preserve the electronic
data on the party, but also to prevent data destruction through
the continued use of a computer."38
A successful record retention program must combine the
application of sound business judgment with concern for legal
consequences. 39 The Eighth Circuit, in Levy v. Remington, de-
36. At common law, there is a duty to preserve evidence. Gates Rubber, 167
F.R.D. at 101. The factors used to assess sanctions for spoliation include the avail-
ability of other evidence, culpability, prejudice, interference with the judicial pro-
cess, other available sanctions, a determination whether the sanctions will
adequately punish the offending party and the relative importance of the data de-
stroyed. Id. Sanctions may include money damages, evidentiary restrictions, de-
fault judgment or the creation of an independent cause of action. Id. at 106-07.
37. See Kenneth J. Withers, Article, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal
Civil Litigation, 2000 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, II.A.2 (2000).
38. Devin Murphy, Article, The Discovery of Electronic Data in Litigation:
What Practitioners and Their Clients Need to Know, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1825, 1834 (2001) (citing James H. A. Pooley & David M. Shaw, Finding Out
What's There: Technical and Legal Aspects of Discovery, 4 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
57, 60 (1995)).
39. See Patrick R. Grady, Comment, Discovery of Computer Stored Documents
and Computer Based Litigation Support Systems: Why Give Up More Than Neces-
sary?, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 523, 539 (1996).
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veloped a three-pronged test for evaluating record retention
programs:
" Is the program reasonable given the totality of the
circumstances?
" Is there a present case concerning the documents and what are
the frequency and severity of the legal issues concerning the
documents?
" Did the corporation institute the record retention program in
good faith?40
By methodically applying these criteria to all orders for data
destruction, inadvertent spoliation of critical data needed for
litigation can be avoided.
A significant distinction between paper and electronic data
is the physical storage space that each requires. A given quan-
tum of electronic data content will occupy far less physical
space than the equivalent content of paper documentation. Ac-
cordingly, businesses create and store significantly more elec-
tronic data than they did paper files, simply because they are
able to do so.41 The logical corollary of this observation is that
destruction of electronic data requires far less time, effort, and
expense. Therefore, businesses routinely carry out data de-
struction protocols because they are simple to perform and be-
cause maintaining a manageably sized data archive speeds
recovery and promotes efficiency. "And when data that can be
stored is not [stored], adverse litigants quickly claim evil intent,
and argue spoliation."42
Archival Media
The archival media employed to store data takes various
forms. System-wide backups stored on magnetic tape represent
the most common archival format for medium to large-sized or-
ganizations, but data also may be stored, and may therefore be
discovered, on office desktop computer/workstations, notebook
computers, home computers, computers of personal assistants/
secretaries/staff, palmtop devices, network file servers/main-
frame computers, disaster recovery backups (stored off site),
40. Levy v. Remington, 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988) (cited in Grady,
supra note 39, at 539).
41. See Massey, supra note 35, at 147.
42. Id. at 147.
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personal backups (diskettes and other portable media such as
CDs and Zip/Jaz® cartridges). 43
Because backup tapes are created to permit recovery of lost
data in the event of disaster they are not sequentially optimized
for retrieval of specific information. Accordingly, if a discovery
request is based largely upon extraction of data from archival
backups, special programs may have to be written to facilitate
this task, requiring the expenditure of considerable time and
money.44 Courts have handed down widely varying decisions in
such cases. Most, however, have agreed that the requesting
party should bear the cost when its demands are unforeseeable
or disproportionate to the benefit likely to be derived, and that
the producing party must bear the cost when the request is rea-
sonable and foreseeable. Courts have also ordered sharing of
production costs. 45
Counsel should acquire a thorough understanding of the
client's data storage and retention policies and information
technology capabilities in order to support his argument regard-
ing allocation of discovery costs. This knowledge should include
a review of "legacy data,"46 an assessment of the degree to which
archived data can or cannot be produced in currently machine-
readable format, and the potential costs involved in producing
such data.47
Despite the best efforts and intentions of the producing
party, sometimes it may not be possible to provide archival ma-
terial in the form requested, because:
43. Sidney S. Kanazawa, Digital Discovery: Rethinking the Purposes of Dis-
covery, (Pillsbury Winthrop LLP, Los Angeles, CA) Jan. 10, 2001, at 11.
44. See Withers, supra note 37, at II.E.1.
45. In Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16355
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), the court ordered the requesting party to pay for the required
programming to retrieve the data it sought from the producing party's computers.
In National Union Electric Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F.
Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1980), the producing party was required to pay for the crea-
tion of a computer tape readable by the computer of the requesting party's counsel,
so that the data could be properly analyzed. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs
Antitrust Litigation, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281 (N.D. Ill.), saw a court-ordered
sharing of costs. See also Simon Prop. Group, L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D.
639 (S.D. Ind. 2000); infra note 69 and accompanying text.
46. Legacy data describes old data retained in a format that may not be capa-
ble of retrieval using modern hardware.
47. See Withers, supra note 37, at II.F.2.
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" Unorganized backup tapes are kept as a substitute for organ-
ized archival files;
* Old data are impossible to read using current hardware and
software; and
* Old data transferred to current media have lost important ele-
ments necessary to establish context or authenticity (i.e., meta-
data).48
Both the special master overseeing discovery and counsel for
the opposing parties must be mindful of this eventuality and
must be prepared to suggest a workaround when faced with the
inaccessibility of archival data.
On-Site Inspection
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a)(2) states that:
Any party may serve on any other party a request.., to permit
entry upon designated land or other property in the possession or
control of the party upon whom the request is served for the pur-
pose of inspecting . . . testing, or sampling the property or any
designated object or operation thereon, within the scope of Rule
26(b). 49
Reading this rule with the benefit of hindsight further prompts
a consideration of the inherent differences between paper-based
("traditional") forms of discovery and computer-based discovery.
The permissiveness of the Rule presents difficulties in a com-
puterized commercial setting that could not have been antici-
pated when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were drafted.
In a traditional environment, each paper document and
each file cabinet is a separately accessible and discrete unit. In-
spection of an individual document may be carried out indepen-
dently of, and without compromising the confidentiality of,
every other document in the party's possession. This is not so in
a computerized environment, in which many files reside on a
single medium (hard drive, tape, floppy disk). Absent some
form of express protection, the examining party may view all
files whether or not they fall within the permitted scope of dis-
covery. Granting the requesting party unregulated inspection
of an opponent's computer media is highly invasive and carries
48. Withers, supra note 37, at II.F.1.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(2).
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potential for substantial abuse. Further, the requesting party's
ability to access directly the computer of the producing party
raises the possibility of intentional or accidental manipulation
and corruption of important proprietary data.50
The case of Gates Rubber Company v. Bando Chemical In-
dustries,5 1 provides a paradigmatic example of the potential for
abuse that inheres in on-site inspections. Gates alleged that
several of its former employees left to join Bando, taking with
them certain proprietary computer programs. This misappro-
priation was alleged to have caused irreparable harm, proxi-
mately resulting in damages amounting to "hundreds of
millions of dollars."52 A special master appointed by the trial
judge was charged with supervising the discovery phase of
litigation.
The court's site inspection order permitted Gates inordi-
nately wide latitude to examine, dissect, copy and inspect al-
most every site, document, desk drawer and computer in
Bando's custody and control. "Gates was presented with the un-
precedented opportunity to copy at will any materials which the
lawyers believed may be relevant to the purposes of their in-
quiry."53 Gates' lawyers came to suspect during the course of
this discovery that certain computerized information had been
erased, which led to a series of motions and counter-motions
seeking sanctions against each party. The hearing of the sanc-
tions phase alone consumed six weeks of evidence and testi-
mony and produced pleadings, exhibits, documents, and
deposition excerpts filling fifty three-ring binders.
In the course of the proceedings, Gates' technical expert
loaded Norton's "Unerase"54 program onto Bando's computer
and in the process of doing so, randomly erased seven to eight
percent of the hard drive's contents. Cross-allegations of de-
struction of documents and software applications followed, but
50. See Withers, supra note 37, at II.G.1.
51. 167 F.R.D. 90 (D. Colo. 1996).
52. Id. at 99.
53. Id. at 100.
54. Norton's "Unerase" is a software application used to recover digital infor-
mation previously deleted from a computer's hard drive directory. In order to fimc-
tion, the application must be installed on the drive from which the information is
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ultimately, the court found no wrongdoing involving spoliation
of data. The court did find, however, that sixty-five percent of
the claims brought by Gates against Bando were unfounded,
and accordingly it awarded costs (after offset) to Bando for de-
fense of those claims.
If there is a moral to this story, it is that computer-based
discovery can be highly disruptive and "massive,"55 and that
parties must employ the most highly qualified computer experts
to aid in the prosecution or defense of their cases. The lessons
learned from Gates Rubber have prompted federal courts to es-
tablish computer inspection protocols designed to avoid data de-
struction claims.56 In each of the cases applying such
protocols5 7 the court has ordered a variant of the following
procedures:
1. The parties must agree upon a neutral, third party expert who,
as an officer of the court, will perform the inspection.
2. The parties, with expert assistance, must agree upon the scope
of the inspection including target computers or servers, target
individuals, departments, or data collections; data ranges;
search terms; or other defining criteria. They must also agree
upon the eventual form of production.
3. The expert will create a "mirror image"58 of the computer data
using accepted computer forensic procedures that preserve the
integrity of the original evidence.
55. See Gates Rubber, 167 F.R.D. at 117.
56. See Withers, supra note 37, at II.G.3.
57. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Local 2000 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
Civil Action No. 00-08 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2000) (Order on Defendants' Motion for
Protective Order and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery); Simon Prop. Group,
L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (cited in Withers, supra note
37, at II.G.3); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
58. A mirror image is an exact copy of a computer medium, rather than a file-
by-file copy of data contained in the medium. The difference between these two
approaches is significant because a mirror image will contain meta-data and frag-
ments of deleted files, both of which may be relevant in revealing evidence of at-
tempted data destruction. A further benefit of creating a mirror image is that it
captures the operations of a business frozen at a specific point in time. Thus, data
inspection and manipulation can be performed on the mirror image without
preventing continued operation of the producing party's business. It is most im-
portant to understand that this mirror image may contain non-relevant and privi-
leged data that the requesting party has no legitimated interest in inspecting. For
this reason, the mirror image must remain in the custody of a neutral third party
such as a special master or court-appointed expert, as a substitute for redaction,
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4. The expert will execute the search on the "mirror image" and
will identify relevant data according to the agreed-upon
criteria.
5. The expert will turn over the responsive data to the respon-
dent's counsel who will review it for relevance and privilege.
6. Respondent's counsel will produce relevant, non-privileged
data to the requesting party in the form agreed upon by the
parties.59
Because this is a "managed" procedure, there is increased likeli-
hood that disagreements arising between the parties will be
substantive rather than procedural. Such protocols invite close
supervision to ensure that the negotiations reach a satisfactory
conclusion and that the resulting inspection agreement is sub-
sequently observed. And because the negotiating process is
time-consuming, it will receive more thoughtful consideration
under the full attention of a master than through a hurried de-
termination by an overburdened judge.
Form of Production
In the pre-computer era, discovery data was provided in
original written form or by means of photocopies, photographs,
or transcriptions. Today, much of the value of requested infor-
mation lies not only in the raw data, but in the format of this
data, i.e., in the structure of spreadsheets, the links within a
relational database, or the meta-data accompanying word
processing documents. The drafters of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure recognized this distinction by amending Rule 34
in 1970 to include data compilations. 60 Courts now are increas-
ingly willing to order production of electronic files even when
printed copies of the data have been previously supplied.61 It is
argued, however, that "Rule 34 makes an extremely awkward
attempt to reach electronic information in its definition of docu-
ments; ... the language is so awkward and convoluted as to be
which may be performed upon paper documents but which has no digital
counterpart.
59. Withers, supra note 37, at II.G.3.
60. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
61. See Withers, supra note 37, at II.H.1.
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almost completely opaque."62 The Note to the 1970 Amendment
to Rule 34 explains that:
The inclusive description of "documents" is revised to accord with
changing technology. It makes clear that Rule 34 applies to elec-
tronic data compilations from which information can be obtained
only with the use of detection devices, and that when that data
can as a practical matter be made usable by the discovering party
only through respondent's devices, respondent may be required to
use its devices to translate the data into usable form .. .[T]he
court may protect respondent with respect to preservation of [its]
records, confidentiality of nondiscoverable matters, and costs. 63
There still exists significant ambiguity as to whether the
amended language of Rule 34 permits discovery of electronic in-
formation of a type that does not fit neatly under the rubric of
"data compilations." Scheindlin and Rabkin ask, "is a cookie or
cache file created by a Web site and automatically downloaded
onto a user's computer, without her knowledge or consent, a
'document' within the scope of Rule 34(a)?"64 They observe that
this evidence constitutes "data" in a generic sense but not "com-
pilations" in the ordinary sense of something composed out of
materials taken from preexisting documents, as contemplated
by the Rule 34 reference to "data compilations." 65
Scheindlin and Rabkin identify two shortcomings of Rule
34 for which they propose solutions. The first is that the rule, in
its present form, does not explicitly permit discovery of many
forms of electronic evidence that are in widespread current use.
The second shortcoming arises because easy discovery of elec-
tronic data is leading to ever-widening discovery requests, re-
sulting in a change of traditional patterns of cost-absorption. 66
Accordingly, the master assigned the task of managing elec-
62. Hearings Before the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Bal-
timore, MD (Dec. 7, 1998) (testimony of Allen D. Black) (quoted in Hon. Shira A.
Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is
Rule 34 up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 330 (2000)).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's note (1970) (quoted in Scheindlin
& Rabkin, supra note 62, at 344-45).
64. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 62, at 347.
65. Id. at 347.
66. See id. at 371-72. A more thorough treatment of Scheindlin and Rabkin's
proposal is beyond the scope of this Note, but the reader is encouraged to refer to
their article for a practical approach to adapting federal rules to the realities of
evolving computer-based business practice.
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tronic discovery must be aware of these potential pitfalls and
must be prepared to take account of them in overseeing dis-
putes as to the scope and cost of production.
Need for Expert Assistance
Before computerization, a party's attorney reviewed the op-
ponent's discovery request, then referred it to the client's ad-
ministrative staff to begin the process of retrieval and
photocopying. In the electronic discovery process, however, it is
the technical experts who are most qualified to assess how the
discovery request will affect the client's EDP environment, and
therefore it is they who should serve as counsel's most impor-
tant strategic partner. It has been suggested that:
[iun many cases, one of the first witnesses to be deposed should be
a member of the opposing party's information technology (IT) de-
partment. Such a witness can provide valuable insight into the
topology and operation of the party's computer system and net-
work, the methods used to insure security of data, sources of po-
tential physical evidence .... 67
As the Gates Rubber case demonstrates vividly, failure to
employ qualified technical experts can seriously impair one's
own case and can result in substantial damage to the opposing
party's operations. Accordingly, computer technology experts
must be well schooled in the requirements of discovery, and
counsel must have the knowledge and skill to direct and assess
the work of these experts. Once each party's expert has ex-
amined his client's computer system and that of the opposing
party, he will be able to advise counsel in negotiating the tech-
nical issues relating to discovery, such as search protocols, priv-
ilege and relevance screening, and production.68 And the
special master possessing relevant technical knowledge will be
suitably equipped to oversee this negotiation.
67. MICHAEL R. OVERLY, OVERLY ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CALIFORNIA,
§ 1.01, at 3-10 (1999) (quoted in Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 62, at 371).
68. See Withers, supra note 37, at I.I.1.
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Simon Property Group, L.P. v. mySimon, Inc.: A Case
Study
Simon Property Group, L.P. v. mySimon, Inc.69 was a trade-
mark infringement action in which the plaintiff moved, inter
alia, to compel defendant's production of relevant documentary
evidence and to make its computers available for examination
by plaintiffs experts. The case is significant for illustrating the
invasiveness and extreme costliness of electronic discovery to
the producing party. The Simon court developed a set of crite-
ria to be applied broadly in considering the propriety of elec-
tronic data discovery requests, including:
" The degree to which the respective parties should bear the eco-
nomic burden of production;
* The extent to which electronically stored documents are discov-
erable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34; and
" Factors to be considered in defining or limiting the scope of
discovery.70
The court readily disposed of the question of discoverability
of computer files and documents under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 34.71 It found that the addition by the July 1, 1970
amendment to Rule 34 of the words "and other data compila-
tions from which information can be obtained, translated, if
necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into
reasonably usable form . . ." evinces legislative recognition of
the need to include electronic data within the ambit of the
rule.7 2 This modification paved the way for the routine discov-
ery of electronically produced and stored documents, with the
result that today, discovery objections based solely upon the
electronic format of requested material are seldom raised and
are rarely successful. 73
The Simon court noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(2)(iii) permits limitations on discovery "where the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely bene-
69. 194 F.R.D. 639 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
70. Id. at 640-42.
71. Id. at 640 (citing FED R. Civ. P. 34(a)).
72. Simon Prop. Group, 194 F.R.D. at 640-42.
73. See Symposium, supra note 2, at para. 5 (comments of David Byer).
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fits," 74 taking into consideration all relevant facts and circum-
stances, including but not limited to:
* The volume of documents subsumed by the discovery request;
" The difficulty and cost of retrieving and reviewing these
documents;
" The difficulty of identifying, evaluating and segregating privi-
leged information;
" The level of technological sophistication required to recover and
convert archived computer files;
* The time required to make determinations of admissibility; and
* The means and methods necessary to protect the ongoing com-
puting environment of the party against whom discovery is
sought while extracting relevant evidentiary material.75
Additionally, when imposing limits upon discovery, courts
should consider such factors as:
" The needs of the case;
* The amount in controversy;
* The financial resources of the parties;
* The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
" The importance of the proposed discovery in resolving these
issues.76
The interrelationship among these variables suggests that
questions of scope and burden cannot be resolved independently
of each other and that the scope of discovery should be deter-
mined, at least in part, by considering the producing party's
size, sophistication and financial strength. These fact-based de-
cisions must be made by individuals with a comprehensive un-
derstanding of the computerized business environment - an
understanding often beyond that possessed by members of the
present judiciary. Recognizing this fact, the Simon court or-
dered that "plaintiff shall select and pay an expert who will in-
spect the computers in question to create a 'mirror image' or
'snapshot' of the hard drives."77 The Simon court's deployment
74. Simon Prop. Group, 194 F.R.D. at 640 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii)).
75. Id. at 642.
76. Id. at 640.
77. Id. at 641 (citing Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 167 F.R.D. 90,
111-13 (D. Colo. 1996)). The court recognized that problems might arise when one
party's effort to preserve and recover files has the potential to seriously compro-
mise the integrity of the other party's data. For example, the installation of a test
program by a requesting party on the computer of the producing party may cause
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of an expert to manage discovery exemplifies the role for the
special master in electronic data discovery proposed by this
Note.
By allowing the expert to employ sufficient manpower to
carry out his assignment, the Simon court wisely converted an
exercise in delay and frustration into a working model for elec-
tronic discovery. The discovery protocol ordered the expert to
employ his special skill and knowledge to recover from defen-
dant's hard drives "all available word-processing documents,
electronic mail messages ... spreadsheets, and similar files[;]"78
to then make these available to defendant's counsel for review;
and finally, to use this information to "supplement defendant's
responses to discovery requests, as appropriate."79 Because the
expert was designated an officer of the court, and because ex
parte communications were prohibited, the parties were able to
communicate freely without waiving the attorney-client privi-
lege, 0 thus facilitating timely production of the desired evi-
dence. The Simon court's wisdom in recognizing the benefit of
extrajudicial electronic discovery management provides a suita-
ble point of departure for exploring the special master's role in
this crucial pretrial function.
The Court's Authority to Refer a Special Master
The federal judiciary displays common bureaucratic char-
acteristics in striving to achieve uniformity of action and pre-
dictability of results. Courts demonstrate this repeatedly by
certain necessary data to be overwritten, resulting in a loss of data by the produc-
ing party. Accordingly, the court gave the producing party the opportunity to ob-
ject to the selection of the expert, and further stated that the expert would carry
out the inspection and copying as an officer of the court, thereby insuring confiden-
tiality. Id.
78. Simon Prop. Group, 194 F.R.D. at 641.
79. Id. at 642. This wording demonstrates the court's willingness to allow the
expert to determine, subject to review by defense counsel, what information be-
yond that volunteered by the producing party should be provided to the requesting
party in response to its discovery request.
80. There is ample case law supporting the premise that voluntary disclosure
of information protected by the attorney-client privilege results in loss of the privi-
lege unless the disclosure is necessary in furtherance of a client's obtaining in-
formed legal assistance. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the
Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991). By granting the expert status as
an officer of the court, the Simon court facilitated communication among the par-
ties and the expert without loss of the privilege.
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their insistence upon issuing the narrowest possible ruling to
effect resolution of a present controversy and by their reluc-
tance to break new legal ground unless doing so is unavoidable.
As any student of the case law knows, however, when unduly
narrow construction of a rule impedes the dispensation of jus-
tice, creative judges can uncover an interpretation that is in
harmony with their desired result.
Commentators have noted that:
The current text of [Rule 53(b)], which courts and practitioners
are likely to need to deal with for the foreseeable future, simply
does not reflect how special masters are in fact used. In general,
some courts, inspired by the Civil Reform Justice Act and the
need for more active judicial case management, are creatively us-
ing special masters for a wide variety of pretrial and post-trial
tasks beyond those contemplated by the drafters of Rule 53 ....
[T]he use of Rule 53, especially in the pretrial area, seems to be
one of bending it for the particular needs at hand.8'
While docket congestion alone may be an insufficient basis
for employing a master, technical and operational factors inher-
ing in all electronic discovery often may provide a special,
though not exceptional, condition justifying the reference. Ac-
knowledgment by courts of this fact is more an evolutionary
step in the development of juridical procedure than a disman-
tling of hallowed traditions. Nonetheless, it is a step that has
faced considerable opposition.
In addressing the right of the district judge to manage the
affairs of his court, some commentators believe that, notwith-
standing Rule 53 and the Magistrates Act, the court retains in-
herent power to enlist the resources necessary to facilitate
dispensation of justice:
The federal judges who have based pretrial references on their
inherent power over judicial proceedings seem to be on much
firmer ground than those who have relied on Rule 53. Even
though the analytical route to this conclusion has some curves in
it, I feel confident that at least in some situations a federal dis-
trict court has inherent authority to delegate frontline responsi-
bility for supervising discovery to a master .... The precedents
that support this conclusion make it clear that there are limits on
81. MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, 1 53.03 (citation omitted).
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the scope of inherent power in this context. Unfortunately, the
cases do not identify those limits with precision.8 2
Writing in 1983, the authors of this passage could not have
foreseen the explosive growth in EDP operations that would oc-
cur during the ensuing two decades. Neither may they have
foreseen the increased need for pretrial discovery assistance to
decide not only what should be discoverable, but also how to
effect that discovery without obstructing the ongoing operations
of the producing party's business.
The Supreme Court considered Rule 53 restrictions on ref-
erence of a master in LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co.8 3 In that
case, it reaffirmed its prior holding in Ex parte Peterson8 4 that
"[t]he use of masters is 'to aid judges in the performance of spe-
cific judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a
cause,' and not to displace the court." 5 The Court granted certi-
orari to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to deter-
mine whether, under the All Writs Act,86 a writ of mandamus
was justified compelling Judge LaBuy to vacate his order of ref-
erence to a master. The holding was unequivocal: "[E]ven 'a lit-
tle cloud may bring a flood's downpour' if we approve the
practice here indulged, particularly in the face of presently con-
gested dockets, increased filings," and techniques.8 7
"[C]ongestion in itself is not such an exceptional circumstance
as to warrant a reference to a master. If such were the test,
present congestion would make references the rule rather than
the exception."88
The Supreme Court in LaBuy identified as its principal
concerns the dual issues of judicial abrogation of primary re-
sponsibility for case management (with its attendant Article III
considerations) and litigants' due process rights. Revisiting its
decision some twenty years later in Mathews v. Weber,89 the
Court declared "LaBuy, although nearly two decades past, is
the most recent of our cases dealing with special masters, and
82. BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 1, at 306.
83. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
84. 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
85. LaBuy, 352 U.S. at 256.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2003).
87. LaBuy, 352 U.S. at 258.
88. Id. at 259.
89. 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
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our decision today does not erode it."90 While the Supreme
Court has adhered steadfastly to its formalistic reading of Rule
53(b), lower courts facing crowded dockets and increasingly vo-
luminous and complex litigation have sought a more permissive
reading of the rule. A long line of cases has unfolded seeking to
induce a reversal of the holding in LaBuy, and while these cases
may not strictly comply with the letter of Rule 53(b), when
viewed expansively, they appear to comport fully with its
spirit.91
90. BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 1, at 319 n.75 (quoting Mathews, 423 U.S. at
274).
91. See, e.g., Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 1984) (seeking to
set aside the decision of a magistrate, claiming that the statute conferring jurisdic-
tion was unconstitutional). While this case dealt with a magistrate rather than a
master, the appellate court recognized close parallels, stating:
[iun essence, then, a trial judge who has appointed a special master in a
nonjury civil case has transformed his role into that of an appellate court, at
least with regard to the resolution of factual issues. In fact, Rule 53(e)(4) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows the parties to agree to
make the master's factual findings final, involves more delegation ofjudicial
power than that at issue under section 636(c).
Id. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit places great stock in the consen-
sual reference of the master because first, "consent can, in certain cases, be a nec-
essary condition for the exercise of jurisdiction." Id. "Second, consent can affect
the limits of permissible delegation." Id. See also In re Pearson, 990 F.2d 653 (1st
Cir. 1993) (denying petitioner inmates' request for a writ of mandamus probing the
continuing need for, or the possible modification of consent decrees affecting the
operation of the Massachusetts Treatment Center for Sexually Dangerous persons.
"[Pletitioners contend[ed] that the order of reference [to a master] constitut[ed] an
'abdication of the judicial function' to a non-Article III adjudicator." Id. at 659.
The appellate tribunal found that "[tihe order's scope, as the judge has delineated
it, seems more akin to rendering 'mere assistance' to the court, a permissible use of
a master in many sets of circumstances .... Id. "Hence, appointing a master to
survey the legislative landscape, investigate the incidence of an impact of changed
circumstances, assess the current relevance of the decrees, and report the results
to the court did not constitute palpable error as a matter of law." Id. at 660. See
also Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988) (in which the appellate
court upheld appointment of a technical advisor, citing Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S.
at 300, 312 (1920) for the premise that "trial judges in the federal system pos-
sessed 'inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments re-
quired for the performance of their duties,' including the power to 'appoint persons
unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial
duties ...... '"Id. at 157.). But see Stauble v. Warrob, 977 F.2d 690, 691 (1st Cir.
1992) (reversing an order of reference under which a special master heard a trial
on the merits. The court "conclude[d] that referring fundamental issues of liability
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Both the need for specialized technical expertise in elec-
tronic discovery management and the benefits conferred by em-
ploying an auxiliary officer to make evidentiary determinations
are illustrated by the case of Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Welles.92 In a discovery conference requested by the plaintiff
before a magistrate judge, a ruling was sought, inter alia, to
determine whether plaintiff could gain access to defendant's
hard drive in order to recover information relevant to the
action. 93
The magistrate granted the request upon the following
rationale:
1. Presuming Plaintiff can provide the court with sufficient evi-
dence that ... no damage will result to Defendant's computer,
the Court will direct the parties to follow this outlined protocol.
2. The court will appoint a computer expert who specializes in the
field of electronic discovery to create a "mirror image" of Defen-
dant's hard drive ....
3. The court appointed computer specialist will serve as an Of-
ficer of the Court.94
While Playboy illustrates the use of both a magistrate and
a court appointed expert, these functions easily could be consoli-
dated in a special master possessing the requisite legal and
technical knowledge to carry out discovery. Notwithstanding
the attractiveness of vesting this responsibility in a sole individ-
ual it would be imprudent to ignore the Article III safeguards
surrounding the judiciary function. Judge Irving R. Kaufman, a
jurist with considerable complex litigation experience, was a
strong advocate for permitting pretrial reference to a master.95
He noted that "where both parties acquiesce in the reference to
[wihile it is axiomatic that the 'judicial power of the United States must be
exercised by courts having the attributes prescribed in Art. III,' federal
judges handling civil calendars have long relied on assistants, such as mag-
istrates, and special masters, who do not possess the distinct attributes of
Article III status. This reliance has grown in direct proportion to the length
of the federal court docket.
Id. at 693. The court observes, further, that "predicating access to auxiliary adju-
dicators on the incidence of such circumstances would likely trivialize Article III."
Id. at 694.).
92. 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
93. Id. at 1051.
94. Id. at 1054-55.
95. See BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 1, at 312-13.
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a master the permissive scope of the reference is broadened,
and, except in those limited instances where the public interest
demands retention of the initial inquiry by the court, reference
should be permitted."96 Despite this view, Judge Kaufman was
acutely aware that reference carries a risk proportionate to the
nature of the duties delegated.9 7 This risk depends upon "(1)
the likelihood that the master's decisions will affect parties'
substantive rights and (2) the likelihood that delegating the
tasks in question will unjustifiably increase litigation costs or
delays."98 Thus, whether by the exercise of inherent judicial
power, by consent of the parties, or by strict adherence to the
requirements of Rule 53, reference of pretrial electronic discov-
ery to a special master must not proceed without regard for the
litigants' due process rights, or for judicial integrity guaranteed
by Article III.
Qualifications of the Special Master
The foregoing review of the differences between electronic
data discovery and the traditional discovery process illustrates
the need for specialized discovery management and explains
why the special master is best suited to carry out the task. In
the Introduction, we questioned whether the current federal ju-
diciary has the requisite understanding to properly manage
electronic discovery. We may reasonably conclude that, during
the early stages in the adoption of a new technology, those unfa-
miliar with the process will be unable to perceive the nuances of
its application. This is not to imply that federal judges lack the
ability to understand the EDP process. Rather, because the
commercial application of computer science and technology re-
quires specialized study for which most judges lack the time,
they are at a disadvantage in making electronic discovery rul-
ings, compared with a fully qualified special master. Further,
the expanded scope of the EDP discovery process places signifi-
cant temporal demands upon the court that it cannot possibly
accommodate in an already crowded calendar.
96. Id. at 312-13 (quoting Irving R. Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts:
Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 459 (1958)).
97. See id. at 380 (quoting Kaufman, supra note 96, at 462).
98. Id. at 381.
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Therefore, when a judge determines that he cannot devote
sufficient time to overseeing and arbitrating the resolution of
cost/need questions, he must turn to a neutral party for assis-
tance in evaluating the reasonable extent of production and to
prevent the imposition of undue burden. As one possible re-
sponse to this situation, "[w]e are seeing an increased use of
special masters to determine what is a reasonable production.
An independent third party is often useful in placing limits on
the amount of electronic data to be reviewed and in determining
how and when data will be shared."99 It is reasonable to believe
that in time the judiciary will acquire greater facility in resolv-
ing EDP-related questions and that the need for a special
master will depend more upon the complexity of an individual
case than upon the format of the requested data.
The Rule 53 definition of a master offers less help in under-
standing the qualifications required for the job than does the
practical definition of "an experienced private attorney, a re-
tired judge, or a law professor to whom a federal court delegates
frontline responsibility either for the entire discovery stage of
an action or for specified, discrete tasks."100 An experienced at-
torney, law professor, or judge will possess knowledge of litiga-
tion practice and of the rules of evidence, but these are only
partial qualifications for managing electronic discovery. To
manage electronic discovery effectively, the master should also
possess an understanding of the mechanics of data processing;
the practicalities of data storage, retention, and retrieval; and a
practical acquaintance with corporate operations and
governance.
Although the master need not know how to perform data
recovery tasks or other forms of forensic investigation in order
to effectively oversee the process, he should be aware of the va-
rious means and methods available to the recovery specialist.
An effective master's broad but specialized skill set can "reduce
the time the litigators commit to educating the person who re-
solves discovery disputes and sets the guidelines for case devel-
99. Symposium, supra note 2, at para. 67 (comments of John Jessen).
100. Id. at para. 5. For purposes of this discussion, it is unlikely at present
that a retired judge would possess the requisite computer knowledge to serve as a
master for electronic discovery.
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opment."''1  Because of the master's knowledge of the
substantive law and of the "tricks of the trade" practiced in law-
suits involving electronic discovery, he may succeed in imposing
greater structure and discipline on the discovery process at an
earlier stage than would otherwise be possible. 10 2 This sharp-
ened focus will beget more timely and responsive production of
requested discovery materials, will decrease the burden upon
and the cost to the producing party and will shorten the pretrial
discovery stage with commensurately foreshortened litigation.
The master must be perceived as integral to the litigation.
His mere introduction into the discovery process may induce the
parties to be more cooperative because they are compelled to
deal with an unbiased individual focused exclusively on the dis-
covery process, rather than with a beleaguered judge who is too
busy to take note of their dilatory maneuvering. 0 3 Accordingly,
it is suggested that the selection of the master be a collaborative
process so that the parties accept him as a neutral officer who
will exercise fairness, impartial judgment, and discretion. Sim-
ilarly, by devoting adequate time to reviewing the qualifications
of the master, the court will view him as an effective adjunct to
the judicial process.'0 4
When disputes arise in discovery, a master with substan-
tial prior technical and business experience will be more likely
to reach a rapid resolution than will a judge who, lacking this
experience, will tend to impose a resolution by fiat. "A master
who enjoys the respect and confidence of counsel from the out-
set will be challenged less often and will be better able to en-
courage cooperation than will a comparably equipped master
with whom the parties are initially unfamiliar. " 10 5 Presumably,
the same holds true with regard to judges.
The discovery of electronic data has caused a shift from a
relatively unsophisticated but labor intensive process, to one re-
quiring specialized technical knowledge. Computerization has
made the protection of confidential data increasingly difficult,
heightening the need for an impartial discovery manager to
101. BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 1, at 14.
102. See BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 1, at 13.
103. See id. at 6.
104. See id. at 42-43.
105. Id. at 42.
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safeguard the due process rights of litigants, and to limit the
imposition of undue economic burden. This development calls
for discovery management similar to that normally required in
complex litigation. Rule 53 is premised on a belief that discov-
ery in complex litigation presents logistical demands beyond the
managerial capacity of the trial judge. An analogous rationale
supports the reference of pretrial electronic data discovery to a
special master, although in such case, the demands are techni-
cal rather than tactical. Accordingly, electronic data discovery
under the aegis of a special master should be viewed norma-
tively, rather than as the illegitimate progeny of a contorted
"exceptional condition" requirement. It is unlikely that we will
see the "flood's downpour" of errant special master references
feared by the LaBuy court 10 6 as long as the trial judge con-
structs his reference order with integrity and proper concern for
the strictures imposed by Article III.
The Special Master as Discovery Manager
Regardless of the differences in format between electronic
and traditional paper-based discovery, the underlying goal of
the process remains the same: to bring to light all relevant evi-
dentiary material that is likely to assist in resolving the liti-
gated controversy. As the information economy continues to
expand, computer-based discovery increasingly will be the norm
rather than the exception. The discovery phase of litigation
practice must inevitably evolve to keep pace with the changes
wrought by computerization.
Because electronic discovery is still largely uncharted terri-
tory, once referred to a case the special master must consider
and rule on a variety of factors absent in conventional document
discovery. 10 7 These include:
Preservation of data;
106. See supra text accompanying note 88.
107. Because the special master is not an Article III judge, he cannot issue
dispositive rulings. Accordingly, to preserve evidentiary issues for appeal, the
master's findings must be reviewed in detail by the trial court judge. Federal
Judge Harold H. Greene expresses his opinion in the Introduction to Managing
Complex Litigation, that impediments to direct preservation for appeal "could...
be overcome.., with some procedural ingenuity." BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 1, at x.




" Location and volume of data;
" E-mail as a unique phenomenon;
" Deleted documents;
" Backup tapes;
" Archives and legacy data;
" On-site inspection;
" Form of production; and
* Need for expert assistance. 08
As early as possible in the discovery process, the special
master must become satisfied that the parties recognize and un-
derstand the EDP implications relating to retention, backup,
archiving and retrieval, and that a program is implemented to
forestall later complications arising from negligent or uninten-
tional spoliation. Because relevancy is a threshold determina-
tion governing admissibility of all evidence, the master must
make this the central issue in considering all discovery
questions109
A critical task for the special master should be the review of
litigants' existing data retention policies early in the pretrial
discovery process. Based on the information gleaned from this
review, the master should impose whatever controls are neces-
sary to ensure that all potentially discoverable documents re-
main available and accessible pending judicial determination of
their materiality and admissibility. Because it is often infeasi-
ble to halt EDP operations while awaiting a particularized dis-
covery 'request, the special master quickly must proscribe the
scope and manner of permitted discovery and must evaluate the
means by which data can be preserved while permitting opera-
tions to continue undisturbed. Determinations of this sort re-
quire that the master have a thorough knowledge of EDP
operations and forensic methods of data recovery.
To the extent that existing record retention policies are
properly and consistently implemented, the job of the master is
made simpler. "Good faith defendants should be able to rely on
established records retention policies to avoid sanctions for de-
108. Withers, supra note 37, at II.A-II.I.
109. See Massey, supra note 35, at 156.
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struction of documents .... Typically, the destruction must be
routine and without intention to conceal, secrete or defraud." 110
While it is true that the master must be concerned with the
adequacy of the litigants' record retention policies, ultimately it
is the responsibility of the parties and their respective counsel
to ensure that an adequate data management system is in place
upon commencement of litigation. By carefully and consistently
adhering to an established regimen of record retention and de-
struction, litigants increase their chances of successfully de-
fending against claims of willful or negligent destruction.
Moreover, courts will be inclined to view this systematic and
scheduled destruction with less suspicion."'
As seen in the Simon case, electronic discovery has the po-
tential to impose significant costs upon the producing party."12
The question of cost allocation is one that the special master is
ideally suited to mediate because of his experience and pre-
sumptive knowledge of industry practice. Using the criteria set
forth in Simon, and the guidance provided by Rule 26(b)(2)(iii),
the special master must evaluate the requesting party's data
requirements, and must be prepared either to limit the scope of
discovery, or to fashion an equitable cost allocation for imposi-
tion by the court.
Of particular concern to all those involved in electronic data
discovery are the cost and the feasibility of gaining access to
data that has long been in storage, often called "legacy data."
Because data processing technology has undergone many
changes since its first general commercial application in the
110. Id. at 167. In Wright v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 868 F. Supp. 183
(S.D. Miss. 1994), destruction of records needed for litigation after the commence-
ment of suit did not result in an adverse spoliation inference because the destruc-
tion took place pursuant to both a federally mandated retention program and to
the company's own established program for periodic destruction of old records. See
also Turner v. Hudson Transit, 142 F.R.D. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a party
on notice that documents in its possession are relevant to litigation or potential
litigation is under a duty to retain such documents only if the party has such notice
as to their relevance). But see Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Communications
Co., L.P., 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14053 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1996) (holding that an
affirmative request was not required to place producing party on notice that it was
required to retain documents subject to discovery despite a routine records de-
struction program that was part of normal computer backup protocols).
111. See Grady, supra note 39, at 542-43.
112. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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1950s, archival media created several decades ago, although
still intact, may no longer be readable by modern hardware. Ac-
cordingly, resort must be had to companies that specialize in
reading legacy data. Even if it is possible to read and convert
this data, doing so often can be very costly. Therefore, the spe-
cial master must evaluate the feasibility of producing the re-
quested legacy data. In addition, once a third party becomes
involved in the process, questions of authentication such as
chain of custody are implicated.
After conducting an analysis of the costs involved, the
master must advise the court regarding allocation of retrieval
costs and must articulate whether, in his opinion, the benefits
of obtaining the requested data warrant the expense and the
effort to be expended. The ability to make this determination
requires comprehensive understanding of the technical aspects
of data recovery, and of the economic and operational hurdles
that must be cleared. A fair resolution must balance the re-
questing party's legitimate need for information against the
producing party's cost of production. Finally, if the requested
legacy data cannot be read or converted to readable form, the
special master's findings of fact must so indicate, as required by
Rule 53(e).
The trial judge's ultimate responsibility for case manage-
ment is unaffected by his reference of a special master, and ac-
cordingly, in the interest of insuring efficiency, impartiality,
effectiveness, and compliance with the strictures of Article III,
the trial judge must supervise the master's activities. To this
end, the court should require from the outset that the master
submit regular, periodic progress reports. The reporting regi-
men should be tailored to the particular circumstances of the
case, with a view toward avoiding added costs or delays. 113 Reg-
ular communication is particularly important in light of the
master's limited power to sanction or to otherwise restrain the
parties.
Those who criticize the use of masters argue that:
* A master has little power to formulate or limit the principal
issues of a lawsuit;
113. See BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 1, at 39.
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" Counsel may feel a greater temptation to test the mettle and
sophistication of a master than of a judge;
" A master may be more concerned than a judge about retaining
the goodwill of the parties and may thus be more accepting of
sloppiness and excuses for nonperformance;
* Absent previous service as a judge, a master may lack adjudica-
tive experience;
* A master steeped in the adversarial process may be unable to
perceive behavior that offends the spirit of the discovery rules;
* A master may make premature or arbitrary rulings in reaction
to aggressive behavior by the parties. 114
We have already acknowledged that early involvement of
the parties in the selection of the master may avert many of
these difficulties. Moreover, active judicial supervision can de-
crease significantly the danger of a master's disappointing per-
formance. Finally, a narrow and carefully tailored order of
reference that identifies the nature and scope of the issues to be
addressed will help the master to concentrate his activity effec-
tively, thereby minimizing the opportunity for the parties to
distract him with spurious digressions from the prescribed
agenda. 115 By drafting an order of reference focused on the core
issues required to survive a motion to dismiss, the judge pro-
vides the master with a road map for successful discovery
management.116
Further, by entrusting this segment of the litigation to an
individual who is able to devote sufficient time and resources to
the discovery phase of the trial, the judge may achieve a more
satisfactory result than were he to undertake discovery man-
agement himself. It has been asserted that:
Some judges in complex litigation seem to substitute wishful
thinking for informed judgment concerning timetables, trying to
solve the problems of large, complex cases by pretending that they
are not large or complex .... Some timetable pressure can enforce
a useful and sometimes necessary discipline; too much such pres-
sure applied in the wrong circumstances can wreck an entire pre-
trial process .... A special master devoting a substantial amount
of attention to one case may be more successful at finding the
114. Id. at 40-41.
115. See id. at 43.
116. See id. at 44.
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proper balance than a district judge with responsibility for many
cases.
117
Because a special master is an officer of the court he is
bound by the code of judicial ethics. This assertion is supported
by case law 18 and by the Code of Judicial Conduct for United
States Judges (hereinafter "Code") 119 with respect to trial stage
references. There is, however, no clear authority discussing the
ethical constraints upon the master in pretrial discovery. 120
Both sound reasoning and an organic construction of the Code
compel the conclusion that, to adequately preserve the due pro-
cess rights of the litigants, it must apply at all stages of
litigation.
Are Statutory Changes Required to Facilitate the Reference of
Special Masters?
We have noted previously that the special master may be
enlisted in the litigation process either under Rule 53(b) or
through the inherent power of the court. In those circum-
stances where a magistrate is referred as a special master, the
Magistrate's Act121 dispenses with the requirement of an excep-
tional condition, thereby permitting the trial judge substantial
latitude in making the reference. This limiting requirement of
an "exceptional condition," however, has attracted considerable
appellate attention, and has spawned substantial academic dis-
course where the special master is referred pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 53.122 For all its fury, however, much of
this discourse may be moot. Unless the order referring the
magistrate to serve as master specifically invokes Rule 53, he
will be excluded from its restraints pursuant to subsection
53(f). 123
117. Robert D. McLean, Pretrial Management in Complex Litigation: The Use
of Special Masters in United States v. AT&T, in BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 1, at 278.
118. See, e.g., In re Gilbert, 276 U.S. 6, 9 (1928) (cited in BRAZIL ET AL., supra
note 1, at 16).
119. 69 F.R.D. 273 (1976).
120. See BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 1 (discussing in greater detail the source of
ethical constraints upon the master at the pretrial stage); see also supra text ac-
companying note 96.
121. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (2003).
122. See, e.g., BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 1.
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(f).
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While it appears that courts thus far have been able to
meet the challenges posed by electronic discovery within the ex-
isting statutory framework, it is likely that the growth of com-
puterization and the expansion of the "information society" will
prompt continued testing of the rationale underlying Rule 53.
At the time of this writing, the foundations of the legal, account-
ing, and securities regulatory establishments have been shaken
by the largest bankruptcies and corporate governance scandals
in modern history. Of central importance in the Enron case, for
example, is the alleged destruction of "a significant but undeter-
mined"124 number of computerized documents by the company
and its accounting firm, Arthur Andersen & Company. It is
likely that the prosecution of this and similar cases ultimately
will turn largely on the discovery of electronic evidence and,
given the dollar value of damages and the number of affected
individuals, the volume of discovery promises to be enormous.
In a case such as this, size alone could present an "exceptional
condition" justifying the reference of a special master. It is
likely that the prosecution of this and similar cases will turn
largely on a small army of computer specialists. Consequently,
more than one special master will be needed to deploy, manage,
and oversee their efforts.
Computer forensics is going to play an important role in recover-
ing documents in the Enron case .... Not only can computer
forensic techniques recover documents, but they can inform inves-
tigators when and how they were deleted .... It is often possible
to determine if a deletion is an innocent act pursuant to a corpo-
rate policy or if there is an ulterior motive. 125
At the time this Note was first contemplated, a change of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing reference of spe-
cial masters would have been thought unlikely, given the pre-
vailing air of conservatism regarding such matters. However,
in light of recent developments in corporate governance and the
impetus toward increasing accountability, the need for a change
in methods of electronic discovery management has become
more readily apparent. Accordingly, a liberalization of rules
124. John Markoff, Data Very Hard to Hide From Computer Sleuths, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at C2.




governing the reference of special masters may now be viewed
more favorably. Even though the judiciary-at-large may in time
acquire increased computer sophistication, exponential growth
of electronic data generation will likely remain one step ahead.
This compels a tacit realization that discovery management has
changed permanently and that the role of the special master is
central to its future success.
Conclusion
In the Introduction to this Note, we posed several questions
intended to inform our conclusion as to relaxation of the Rule 53
restrictions governing reference of a special master in cases in-
volving substantial discovery of electronic data.
Because computer technology and its application present a
body of specialized knowledge not yet within the grasp of most
federal judges, we have suggested that discovery tasks calling
for such knowledge be managed by an individual with the requi-
site proficiency to make fully informed decisions. The special
master has been proposed as an appropriate officer to shoulder
this responsibility because the referring judge may choose an
individual with the requisite combined legal and technical back-
ground and may closely control both his activities during discov-
ery and the outcome of his work. This author believes that, as
the judiciary gains competence in resolving EDP-related mat-
ters, the need for reference of a special master will be limited to
those cases in which the complexities of the litigation, rather
than the format of the data, prompt the presiding judge to enlist
assistance.
The special master who understands EDP protocols and
who has a practical appreciation of how businesses operate can
play a significant role in the discovery phase of litigation. By
evaluating the parties' data retention policies, establishing
boundaries for permitted invasion of the producing party's EDP
environment, and assessing the apportionment of costs attend-
ant to discovery, the master can foreshorten litigation and re-
duce friction between the parties as well as the resulting costs.
Moreover, the district court judge can minimize drawbacks at-
tendant to the reference of a special master by carefully draft-
ing and narrowly tailoring the order of reference.
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This author further contends that Rule 53, as it stands,
represents an unnecessary impediment to the reference of spe-
cial masters in litigation involving substantial electronic data
discovery. Appropriate modification of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 53(b) would facilitate reference of a master to handle
pretrial discovery without inviting abuse of the process. It is
important to recognize that "complex litigation" is no longer
characterized only by the volume of data, but also by the com-
plexity of discovery, retrieval, and production of electronic data.
In the computer age this is no longer an "exceptional condition,"
but the norm. Therefore, the following modification of Rule 53
is suggested [new text in brackets]:
Rule 53. Masters
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception
and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference
shall be made only when the issues are complicated [, including
the discovery, retrieval and production of electronically gener-
ated or stored data]; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in
matters of account and of difficult computation of damages, a
reference shall be made only upon a showing that some excep-
tional condition requires it. [Complex or difficult issues relating
to the discovery, retrieval or production of electronically gener-
ated or stored data shall be deemed an exceptional condition.]
Upon consent of the parties, a magistrate judge may be desig-
nated to serve as a special master without regard to the provi-
sions of this subdivision.
Until the legal community gains expertise and confidence
in addressing the technical underpinnings of electronic discov-
ery, the need for extrajudicial assistance is likely to persist. By
adopting an "Emperor's new clothes" approach to the utilization
of the special master, the highest courts of the nation stead-
fastly adhere to the letter of a rule while disregarding consider-
ations of practical case and calendar management. A less
stringent and hide-bound interpretation of Rule 53 would sig-
nificantly enhance the ability of the overburdened judge to
manage his caseload, while arguably delivering swifter and
more equitable justice.
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